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Grygiel: The Limits of Sea Power

THE LIMITS OF SEA POWER
Jakub J. Grygiel

T

he most significant clashes between great powers are occurring on land. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the rivalry between Iran and the United States
and its regional allies, the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan, and the expansion of
China’s influence along its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) vectors—these are just a
few illustrations of the persistent vying for continental political control and influence. For a maritime power such as the United States, these conflicts—with the
exception of China’s naval actions in the South China Sea—present a peculiar and
recurrent challenge, because they take place on continental Eurasia and not on
the sea. The United States needs superior naval power and command over maritime access routes to be able to project its will across the oceans. But the other
players—from Russia to China and Iran—enjoy internal, continental lines of
communication that, while perhaps not as cost-effective as maritime routes, can
be shorter and are less vulnerable to seaborne predations. As a result, from the
perspective of the United States, sea power is necessary but also has serious limits.
The key question for any maritime power is how to translate its control over the
sea into political influence over the land. This conversion of sea power into strategic effects on the continent is neither guaranteed nor easy. Sailing undisturbed on
the oceans does not mean that a sea power, such as the United States, has political
influence on land; control of the sea does not yield power automatically over the
land. This recurrent question and the attendant challenge are not insurmountable,
of course, and throughout history maritime states
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level—managing rather than defeating the continental rival are some of the approaches that sea powers have adopted to deal with their own limits. But these
limits are enduring, requiring continued attention; they never can be overcome
fully—they only can be mitigated.
Even raising the possibility that sea powers have inherent weaknesses goes
against a Mahan-inspired partiality for the historical superiority of maritime
states. Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, was the “evangelist of
sea power,” writing for a rising maritime power and passionately trying to convince his American audience of the greatness of sea power and the importance of
having a navy.1 He pointed out persuasively that sea-lanes were of greater strategic
value than land routes, and thereby highlighted the importance of who controlled
them. “Land carriage . . . toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to
replace and supplant the royal highway of nature’s own making.”2 Several decades
before Mahan, John Adams had summed up this great faith in maritime power
eloquently. In an 1802 letter, he wrote,
The council which Themistocles gave to Athens—Pompey to Rome—Cromwell
to England—DeWitt to Holland—and Colbert to France, I have always given, and
shall continue to give to my countrymen—That as the great questions of commerce
between nations and empires must be decided by a military marine, and war or
peace are determined by sea, all reasonable encouragement should be given to a
navy. The trident of Neptune is the sceptre of the world.3

Undoubtedly, control of the sea is a precondition for any far-reaching policy that
a power such as the United States may want to pursue; without it, the United States
is severed from the rest of the world, turning into an isolated, continental island,
not only impotent but vulnerable to the seaborne attacks of adversaries.4 Moreover,
sea powers have several advantages over land powers. The pressure on their borders
tends to be lower than for their continental rivals; in the purest example, islands are
more secure than landlocked countries. They have access to, and can control, the
maritime arteries of regional and global commerce, making it possible for them to
influence the economic welfare of others. They tend to have a more expansive outlook, thinking of distant lands and seeking faraway markets. They have the means
to attack a rival state in an unexpected location on its periphery, outflanking it and
distracting it from its main vector of expansion. And because of their combination
of range with relative security, sea powers tend to enjoy a diplomatic flexibility that
a land power, surrounded by enduring enemies, lacks. Mahan, therefore, was not
wrong when he argued—and in doing so incited envy among the leaders of land
powers such as late-nineteenth-century Germany—that the great powers in history tended to be sea powers. Or, as Paul Kennedy qualified it, writing of the late
nineteenth century, “Sea power, as represented by a large surface fleet, commercial
activity, naval bases at home and abroad, remained still the best indicator of the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/8
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relative national power of all those nations who wished to play on the world stage.”5
And U.S. history continues to demonstrate the benefits of being a sea power with
access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the markets located on their shores.
But sea powers also have many handicaps that often are forgotten, resulting
in a dangerous overestimation of their safety, influence, and staying power in
a competitive world. From the Athenian Pericles to Germany’s Admiral Alfred
von Tirpitz, many political leaders placed enormous confidence in the ability
of maritime command to protect their countries and of naval power to defeat
their rivals.6 It gave them a false sense of power. A more clear-eyed assessment
of power—one less enamored of the grandeur associated with naval might—
often revealed that such hope was unwarranted, and that it often ended up having
tragic results for the naval aspirant or even the established sea power.
Two weaknesses—or enduring challenges that need to be addressed—have characterized all sea powers in history. First, to be competitive, sea powers have to
convert their command of the seas into political effects on land—a feat whose
accomplishment is not automatic and requires certain conditions that often are
outside the sea power’s control. Second, because of their flexibility in alliances
and basing, sea powers suffer from a credibility gap that weakens their staying
power in faraway lands.
Both of these weaknesses revolve around a core problem: that politics occur
on land, where people live, and commanding the seas does not guarantee the
desired political outcomes on land.7 A purely continental school of strategy—if it
emphasizes that the only political, economic, and military dynamics that matter
occur on land—is certainly too dismissive of the strategic benefits of sea power.8
But a purely maritime-power grand strategy—if it does not consider how to address the fundamental challenge of how to use command of the sea to achieve
political outcomes on land and does not deal with the inherent limitations of sea
power—is likely to fail. In sum, political outcomes are achieved on land, and sea
power, under certain conditions, can be a useful tool.9 Julian S. Corbett, the British naval strategist concerned with how to use maritime power to influence political dynamics on the European continent, wrote that “[s]ince men live upon the
land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been
decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against
your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes
it possible for your army to do.”10
FROM SEA TO LAND
The first weakness—the challenge of converting sea power into political effect—
is perhaps the most pervasive, and it becomes particularly evident when a sea
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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power competes with a continental rival. Translating superiority on the seas into
political influence on land is neither automatic nor dependent exclusively on the
sea power’s skills. In fact, the main determinant of this weakness lies in the nature
of the sea power’s rival, particularly its exposure to and dependence on the sea.
As James E. S. Cable put it, the “elephant is not vulnerable to the crocodile until
his trunk dangles near the water’s edge.”11 The less reliant the rival is on the sea,
the less vulnerable it is to a maritime blockade, for example. In such cases, from
the sea power’s point of view, its command of the seas is less useful and offers less
leverage than it might wish.
Historically, the advantage of sea powers stemmed from the cost-effectiveness
of maritime navigation and the seaborne transport of goods and forces, as Mahan suggested in the quote given previously. Venice, for example, benefited from
an improvement in navigation in the Mediterranean from the eleventh century
on, driven by advances in shipbuilding, the enhanced security of key maritime
passages, and a growing demand for high-value goods, which combined to give
greater weight to sea-lanes over land routes. Hence, the First Crusade at the end
of the eleventh century went mostly by land through Constantinople to Jerusalem, while the Third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century proceeded more by
sea, as did the notorious Fourth Crusade in the early thirteenth century.12 Control
of the sea, then, bestowed something of enormous value on Venice, or any other
power capable of holding it, because it provided leverage over other polities that
relied increasingly on maritime commerce and transport.
A similar dynamic favored Great Britain in the nineteenth century, allowing
it to turn its maritime dominion into diplomatic supremacy. Like Venice, Great
Britain rose to great power
in an era of primitive overland communications. There were few all-weather roads, no
motor road vehicles, and only the beginnings of a railway grid. Large-scale movement
of people and bulky freight overland, even for relatively short distances, was slow and
costly. The advantage of water-borne transport was nearly everywhere decisive. Under
these conditions blockade of a country’s ports could be a paralyzing experience. Furthermore, it was generally quicker and cheaper in those days to travel around Europe
than to cross it. Though the island of Britain lies on the periphery of Europe, the superior mobility of movement by sea rendered the British position strategically central
vis-à-vis every continental country, so long as the British Navy controlled the sea.13

But the strategic advantage of the seas ebbs and flows in history. Land communications are not perennially inferior and sea-lanes are not inexorably ascendant
in strategic value. In some historical periods, a sea power may compete with a rival land power that does not rely heavily on the seas, and therefore is less vulnerable to the sea power. Therefore the ability of a maritime state to wield influence
is diminished considerably by factors that are outside its control.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/8
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The possibility that sea power would decrease in strategic relevance was envisaged by the two most famous geopolitical thinkers, Sir Halford J. Mackinder and Admiral Mahan. Both argued broadly that the sea powers on the outer
edges of Eurasia were outflanking the traditional potentates on the landmass.
But access to oceanic routes combined with the maintenance of a large navy constituted a form of power that could be withstood, and perhaps at some point
challenged, by a large, well-organized power located in the continental core. The
principal threat to maritime dominance therefore was not another power with a
large navy (although that, of course, could be a cause of intramaritime rivalry)
but a continental center, impenetrable to a sea power’s sorties, united by wellfunctioning land routes, and economically self-sufficient. Another way to describe this nineteenth-century competition is that it was between steamships
and railroads, between the efficiency of naval navigation and the speed of land
transport. But the general principle has applied throughout history: control of the
sea matters in a competition between sea and land powers only when maritime
routes are vital to the latter.
The corollary of this principle is that sea powers have a strong interest in preventing the improvement of land routes that could unify a continental power
or, more broadly, that would shift commerce away from the sea. But at the same
time they have a limited ability to shape this balance of advantages between land
and sea routes. They certainly may try to obstruct the development of continental commerce and to compensate with technological innovations in maritime navigation, but the outcome of this balance does not lie exclusively in their
own hands. The land power can engage in efforts, such as railroad building in
nineteenth-century continental Europe or the development of pipelines and
roads across Eurasia in more-recent decades (e.g., China’s OBOR efforts), that
are to a large degree impervious to the sea power’s influence and may result in a
considerable diminishment of its grip over the continent.14
As the continental power’s dependence on and vulnerability to the sea decrease, the maritime power has to figure out other ways to exercise pressure on
land. As a tool, a naval blockade of an enemy is very selective (targeting a specific power and not others) and low risk (easy to turn on and off); however, it
works only if the targeted state relies on the sea.15 And in any case, while a naval
blockade can starve a land power of vital resources, hurting its economy and
society, on its own it cannot dislodge the rival from a piece of territory or defeat
it comprehensively. The naval power may hope to be able to change the enemy’s
behavior by merely showing its ships offshore, coercing the rival by the promise of punishment, especially along its coastline.16 Modern airpower extends the
range of naval forces, making targets deep inside the continental mass vulnerable
and reinforcing the threat of a seaborne standoff attack. But, like a naval-artillery
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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barrage, this is an exercise in targeting that may have limited lasting effects on
local political dynamics.17 In the end, there may be a need to inflict a defeat on
the continental power, or at least to establish control over a coastal area, and to
achieve such an objective airpower and ships floating at a distance do not suffice.18 The mere control of sea-lanes and the threat of a maritime blockade are
insufficient to influence the behavior of a continental rival that has a limited exposure to and reliance on the sea.
To penetrate the rival state’s continental shell and have a significant effect on its
political and economic dynamics, sea powers historically had three main options:
amphibious assaults (resulting in the establishment of a presence) on the enemy’s
coastal regions, pressure on the rival’s land borders, and control over internal seas.19
Continental Military Presence
The first option is perhaps the most visible, because it involves fleets delivering
forces onto shore, followed by sieges of cities and other land battles. Usually,
however, such an attack on a coastal fortress or port has been extremely limited
in geographic scope, and has not been followed by a massive and lengthy invasion of the rival’s territory. Most historical maritime powers, from Venice to Great
Britain, focused on ports and other strategic outposts along sea-lanes; they were
aware that territorial control required manpower and resources that their states
did not have and that were better used on the sea in any case. Instead, the sea
power’s purpose was to deprive a rival of a safe harbor so it could damage the
rival’s fleet, reduce its seaborne commerce by attrition, or both. Of course,
another gain was a base for its own use. Only rarely, however, could it actually
overthrow the hostile polity.20
A limited continental commitment permitted the sea power to maintain a focus
on the maritime realm, keeping control of the sea-lanes and accessing distant markets and cities. But the disadvantage was that it had a narrow effect on the hostile
land power, and in fact the absence of a long-term presence on the continent exposed the sea power to the rise of land threats that remained unchecked until the
only option to deal with them was appeasement.21 For instance, with the exception of the Fourth Crusade’s targeting the imperial remnants of Byzantium, Venice
never fully defeated the rival continental power in question, such as the Ottoman
Empire or Hungary. It could thwart a competitor from accessing and controlling a
sliver of the sea, or it could inflict a punishing raid on an outpost that was within
easy reach of the sea, but it could not overpower its enemy.22 Land-based allies are
a way for sea powers to compensate for a limited continental commitment, but the
strength of such alliances is tied to the sea power’s guarantee to the allies, demonstrated by its durable physical presence. These land-based allies thus are not
an alternative to a sea power’s continental commitment but an integral part of it.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/8
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Continental powers can be defeated only by depriving them of land, conquering their territories piecemeal, and weakening and devastating their armies
through battles.23 As a result, maritime powers, whose efforts focus on the sea and
who often are very sensitive to casualties, are more inclined to use diplomacy to
conciliate their rivals rather than to embark on a land expedition aimed at territorial conquest and defeat of their enemies. The inherent limitations they have on
land lead them toward a grand strategy of managing, rather than defeating, their
continental rivals.
Pressure on the Rival’s Land Frontier
Creating pressure along the rival’s land borders is another option at the disposal
of the sea power. The goal is to inflict costs on the continental enemy, most importantly to redirect its attention from the sea to its immediate neighbors along
a land frontier.24 Land borders have a powerful diversionary effect because they
shape the security of the state’s homeland most immediately. Mahan went so far
as to suggest “the inability of a state with even a single continental frontier to
compete in naval development with one that is insular, although of smaller populations and resources,” indicating the enormous vulnerability any state experiences on its land side.25 A sea power, then, can take advantage of this weakness of
the enemy by generating pressure on its rival’s land frontier. But usually, because
of logistical difficulties or a lack of suitable resources, a sea power pursues such a
strategy indirectly, through the forces of other states or groups. Such an approach
requires diplomacy—that is, some form of bribery or subsidies—that can convince the rival’s neighbors to push on the land frontier. Or, in some other cases,
the sea power can create conditions for an exacerbated rivalry on land among
various powers by inciting conflicts and skillfully shifting its support from one
side to the other.
Yet ultimately, the outcome is in the hands of other actors, leaving the sea
power at their mercy and requiring a constant and skillful diplomatic effort to
keep them either on its side or in conflict with each other. At any point, these
powers jockeying for control on land can reach a deal to end their conflict, leaving the sea power without a means to exercise influence on the continent. The
geopolitical nightmare for Great Britain, for instance, was the rise of a continental alliance—a “thievish partnership” between France and Russia—that would
cut Britain off from Europe and challenge its interests in the Mediterranean and
the Middle East.26 During World War II, the great fear in London and Washington was that Stalin would reach a separate peace with Hitler—another MolotovRibbentrop Pact—leaving the maritime powers without a way to exert pressure on
Germany’s eastern land borders.27 Similarly, today the great geopolitical question
for the United States is whether Russia will be more aligned with China—establishing a continental entente—rather than maintaining a lengthy land frontier of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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friction. In brief, relying on another power to establish lasting sources of continental diversion of a rival is a sometimes necessary but potentially precarious
strategy for the sea power.
Control of Internal Seas
The third way for a sea power to influence a land rival’s actions is to control the
internal seas of and the “brown waters” immediately adjacent to the opponent.
These are waters that either are surrounded by land or pierce the continental
shell, in the form of bays or channels between coasts and nearby islands. Each
bay, inlet, or river can become a “dagger into the interior.”28 For the land power,
they function as internal routes, linking one region to another through waterways rather than roads, on top of serving as access points to the wider seas. A
sea power that establishes naval superiority in such waters can control the movements along the coast and even riverine trade, and by doing so it can impose
costs on the rival, translating the power of the navy into economic and political
effects on land.
Throughout history, rivers have enabled crucial extensions of sea power, allowing a maritime state to extend influence along the internal arteries of commerce, where a large percentage of the local population also tended to live (e.g.,
the Congo River for the Belgians, the Red [or Hong] River for the French in
Indochina).29 This is a lesson that Mahan drew from history as well as from his
personal experience as an officer in the Union navy during the American Civil
War. In his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters (1883), he describes how the
Union’s control of coastal waters from Key West to the outlet of the Rio Grande
and its penetration along the Mississippi River hemmed in the Confederate
states.30 These Union naval efforts, on top of imposing serious economic costs
through a blockade of the South, fractured the enemy’s territorial integrity.
But a brown-water strategy also reveals a sea power’s weakness, because it is
an imperfect substitute for an intervention and presence on land. It works best as
a joint operation in conjunction with land forces that sea powers, as mentioned
earlier, often are reluctant to use. Such a limited, or supporting, role was assigned
to U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean during the early Cold War, to back the
main efforts of allied forces in a land war in Europe and, in the best-case scenario,
to open a second front on the southern flank of the USSR to divert some of the
Soviet forces away from their westward march.31
Moreover, while the naval power can break a continental state’s territorial integrity by establishing naval superiority in these brown waters, the land power
equally can deny control of these waters to its rival without having to build a
matching fleet.32 Often the nature of internal waters, whether bays or larger seas
circumscribed by land, is such that they can be controlled through a continental

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/8
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strategy of dominating key pieces of real estate. The positioning of land forces, and
in some cases small littoral fleets, on strategic choke points (such as the Gallipoli Peninsula on the Dardanelles Strait or the deeply embayed Dalmatian coast)
can serve to harass, and even deny passage to, the sea power’s navy. Such a continental strategy creates bastions along the littoral that constrain the naval movements of a maritime rival. In the most modern iteration of this approach, a land
power such as Russia or China can deny access to a maritime power through the
development of weapons that from the coast can threaten to inflict unacceptable
costs on a hostile naval force (the so-called antiaccess/area-denial approach).33
An even more ambitious strategy for a land power is to conquer the coast surrounding the sea, challenging the rival state’s naval superiority by denying it access
to ports and safe harbors. As Napoléon allegedly said in 1806, his goal was “to
conquer the sea through the power of land.”34 Similarly, the ancient Roman Republic pursued a continental, rather than a thalassocentric, strategy, extending
control over the circumference of the Mediterranean Sea.35 The Russian empire
also sought to enclose the Black and Baltic Seas from the seventeenth century on.36
This is a form of sea power by coastal control that continental powers can achieve
despite the rival’s naval superiority. In fact, naval superiority loses its effectiveness
in semienclosed seas.37 The competition among great powers as a struggle of navies versus land forces was made more pronounced—while perhaps benefiting the
land powers more—by the gunpowder revolution and the advent of coastal artillery from the fifteenth century on.38 Another way to put this is that a land power
can exercise control over internal or semienclosed seas without having naval superiority; it can establish control of the sea without having command of it.
Sea powers’ weakness, then, is that they may be unable to translate their superiority on the seas into political effects on land. And if they cannot project influence
on land or if they control sea-lanes that are irrelevant to their rivals, then their
naval capability is an expensive, capital-intensive resource that is of but limited
use in statecraft. It can bring them wealth and even protect them from potentially
hostile forces coming from the sea, but beyond this limited defensive role it has
little influence over the land powers. Hence, Rome succeeded in preventing an
attack on its home territory from Macedonia, an ally of the Carthaginian Hannibal, simply by positioning a naval squadron in the Adriatic near Brindisi, so that
“not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in Italy.”39 But such a show of force is
more useful to prevent an attack than to force the rival to accept more-onerous
conditions; it is a tool of prevention and deterrence, not of compulsion. As illustrated by the fifth-century BC war between Athens and Sparta, control of the sea
allows the maritime power to survive, but it does not suffice as a means to defeat
the land rival.40
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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SEA-POWER FLEXIBILITY AND DIPLOMATIC PERFIDY
Sea powers face a second considerable limitation. Since they are blessed with
many strategic options of where to project their force, this flexibility decreases
the credibility of their staying power in any given location.41 This is what the
English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon suggested, perhaps inadvertently, when he wrote that “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may
take as much or as little of the war as he will.”42 The relative ease of movement
that maritime powers have—for instance, to show up in distant places through
multiple sea routes—bestows an advantage over a land power that must focus
on its immediate neighbors.43 The American political scientist Nicholas J. Spykman observed as much when he envisioned the nature of continental expansion as a series of concentric circles, made predictable in their sequencing by
the necessary contiguity of territorial control. Maritime powers can hop from
point to point, skipping difficult-to-control outposts or changing their market
outlets.44 Hence, as the American strategic theorist Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN,
described it, “the sailor or airman thinks in terms of an entire world, [while]
the soldier at work thinks in terms of theaters, in terms of campaigns, or in
terms of battles.”45
But this tactical luxury of high mobility has diplomatic costs. The possibility
of moving away with little effort also can translate into an easy exit for a maritime
power. This flexibility can be interpreted as fecklessness. As a result, every time
a maritime power establishes a presence on a distant coast or island, it does so
under the shadow of doubt regarding the strength of its long-term commitment.
And even when a sea power is locked in a relentless competition with a continental rival, its limitations mentioned earlier push it toward a policy of managing the
rival—which at times may include appeasing and even aligning with it. The difficulty that sea powers have in defeating a continental power makes them at least
seem unreliable to other polities that may be in the path of a given land power’s
expansionistic impulses. Unreliability can translate into diplomatic perfidy, with
the sea power committing to land-based alliances but lacking either the capacity
to protect allies fully from their continental rival or the will to devote sufficient
resources to defeat the enemy.
The simplest geographic variable—distance—affects not just the ability to deliver power (the effect of the so-called power gradient: the farther
the projection of power, the more costly and less effective it is) but also credibility. Venice, for instance, had an easier time convincing its rivals of its commitment to maintaining a monopoly over trade at the nearby outlet of the Po
River than it did of its intention to maintain its long-term presence in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean islands. Maintaining its stato da mar
possessions in the Mediterranean required constant efforts and repeated
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/8
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reconquests. Rebellious indigenous populations (e.g., in Crete) may have calculated—like every guerrilla force in history—that their commitment to their own
islands was infinitely firmer than that of the distant Venetians.46
The relative weakness of credibility consumes resources because sea powers
have to use force constantly to demonstrate their willingness to stay in a distant
place. Thus, being a sea power is an expensive proposition, not only because of
the costs associated with maintaining a superior naval force, but also because of
the unremitting demands to show presence in faraway lands, to maintain custody over vital ports, and to respond to recurrent mutinies in distant outposts.
The protection the seas offer gives the maritime power the leeway to abandon allies without suffering a dramatic loss of security. Whether the allies actually are abandoned is less relevant than the reputation for unreliability that
attaches to a sea power. It was just such a reputation that gave England the
moniker “Perfidious Albion.” As seventeenth-century French bishop JacquesBénigne Bossuet put it in a sermon, “England, perfidious England, which the
ramparts of her seas made inaccessible to the Romans.”47 The security that the
sea provides goes hand in hand with a latent detachment—which others often
interpret as perfidy.
The grip of sea powers over the continents is precarious, even when they
dominate the oceans. They can endure protracted great-power competitions,
win wars, accumulate the most fabulous fortunes, establish footholds in the farthest ends of the earth, and even become objects of jealous emulation for states
locked in a continental bastion. But they also have serious limitations that stem
from their very nature as masters of the seas, because their maritime strength
has limited effects on land. There are, of course, answers to these constraints,
ranging from vying for control of inland seas to keeping some presence on the
continent, but they only mitigate the limitations, which remain as enduring
features of maritime powers. The American historian Theodore Ropp allegedly would walk into his classroom, point to a world map, and announce to his
students that “everything blue belongs to us.” The problem, of course, was how
to translate such control of the “blue” into a victory that included control over
the “brown” and the “green.”48
The logical conclusion of this analysis of a sea power’s limits is that two
conditions must be present (although not necessarily simultaneously) for a sea
power to have an effective strategy and to compete successfully with a land
rival. First, the sea power must maintain a continental presence.49 The extent
and scope of that presence will vary, as they necessarily are linked to the peculiarities of the moment; the effort may require massive physical presence (e.g.,
American involvement in the European campaign in World War II), aid to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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guerrillas (e.g., the British approach in the early-nineteenth-century Peninsular
War), or large bases and powerful allies (e.g., the late-twentieth-century U.S.
approach). But without such a presence, the translation of maritime power into
continental influence is sporadic at best and impossible at worst.
The second condition is that the continental rival must be exposed to the sea
and be vulnerable to a threat of disruption of its access to sea-lanes. The assessment of this second condition should shape the sea power’s efforts on the first
condition; the less vulnerable to the sea the land power is, the greater the necessity for the sea power to have a continental presence. For example, the USSR
was not very dependent on maritime commerce, and thus was less susceptible
to the threat of a naval blockade. Moreover, its main vectors of expansion were
on the Eurasian landmass, with internal lines of communication, and hence its
efforts were less vulnerable to Western maritime interdiction. Thus, the United
States had to have a large continental presence in Europe to exercise deterrence
and influence Soviet behavior. Now, China’s economy is more vulnerable to the
sea, and an American naval presence demonstrating our command of the seas
is our primary effort at affecting its behavior. But if Beijing firms up its control
over land routes linking China with the rest of Eurasia, creating a continental
core, American naval forces floating in the Pacific Ocean will have considerably
less effect on its decisions and behavior.
Eventually, the risk all sea powers face is that they will end up like the
French man-of-war positioned off the African coast described by the PolishBritish writer Joseph Conrad. “In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water,
there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent.” Nothing happened, of
course, because “nothing could happen,” even though there must have been a
“camp of natives . . . hidden out of sight somewhere.”50 “Firing into the continent” is an activity that may give the impression of might, but in fact has little
impact.
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